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Abstract
This paper explores the use of metaphorical expressions in the description of 
seizure experiences by patients with epilepsy and patients with psychogenic 
non-epileptic seizures. The paper addresses two main questions. First, what is 
the range of metaphorical expressions which patients use to describe their 
seizure experiences, and can these be related to conventional metaphors used 
by healthy individuals? Second, is the difference in the underlying cause of our 
patients’ seizure experiences in any way reflected in their use of metaphorical 
expressions? The paper suggests that the answer to both of these questions is 
affirmative, which strengthens the embodiment hypothesis. Implications for 
our understanding of patients’ experiences of seizures and of the difference 
between epileptic and non-epileptic seizures are also discussed.
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1.	 Introduction
In this paper we examine the occurrence of metaphorical expressions in de-
scriptions of seizure experiences by patients with epilepsy and patients with 
psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (or “pseudo-seizures”). It is well-known 
that faced with the task of conveying the nature of a particular experience, 
people commonly revert to the use of metaphor — that is, to describing the 
experience in question in terms of another experience. Cognitive linguistic 
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r esearch on metaphor has shown that this is not only the case with highly com-
plex and unusual experiences: in fact, “It is hard to think of a common subjec-
tive experience that is not conventionally conceptualised in terms of metaphor” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 45).
1.1. Metaphor in linguistics and health communication
The aim of much cognitive linguistic research on metaphor has been to formu-
late a system of “conventional metaphor” — a system of metaphor which may 
be assumed to be shared by all or most speakers of a particular language, based 
on common subjective experiences. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
this system rests on mappings between two conceptual domains. For example, 
the statements I see what you’re saying and It looks different from my point of 
view contain several metaphorical expressions based on a mapping between 
seeing and understanding, such that the experience of understanding can be 
described in terms of the experience of seeing (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 48). 
The statements Our relationship is off the track and Look how far we’ve come 
again contain several metaphorical expressions, this time based on a mapping 
between the experience of a relationship and that of a physical journey (Lakoff 
1993: 206). More recent corpus-based and discourse-oriented analyses 
(Deignan 2005; Cameron and Deignan 2006; Allen 2009) have shown that the 
instantiation of conventional metaphors in language use is far from straightfor-
ward, and argue for a closer consideration of recorded discourse in a variety of 
interactional settings.
While cognitive linguistic research on metaphor has traditionally focused 
attention on frequently occurring metaphorical expressions, research on meta-
phor in health communication has traditionally concentrated on idiosyncratic 
metaphors used by individual patients or practitioners. For example, Bowker 
(1996) presents an analysis of metaphorical expressions in the diaries she her-
self kept when coping with cancer. Gibbs and Franks (2002) provide an over-
view of related literature and conclude that research in health communication 
has “downplayed the importance of conventional metaphorical expressions” 
(ibid.: 142). According to Gibbs and Franks, this leaves an important question 
unaddressed, namely “whether the metaphors employed by people who are ill 
or recovering from illness are different from those used by people in talking 
about their ordinary, healthy experiences” (ibid.: 141). On the basis of a study 
of the use of metaphor by a group of women describing their experiences with 
cancer, Gibbs and Franks suggest that this is not the case. Firstly, they show 
that each of the women uses multiple metaphors and that there is considerable 
overlap in the use of certain metaphors across women. Secondly, they show 
that most of these common metaphors relate straightforwardly to conventional 
metaphors described in cognitive linguistic work. For example, cancer is re-
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currently described as allowing for new understanding in terms of clearing vi-
sion (It allowed me to see life in a different way, It was like putting on a new 
pair of glasses), which can be understood as an instantiation of the conven-
tional metaphor “understanding is seeing”. Subsequent work has highlighted 
other conventional metaphors in patients’ descriptions of cancer experiences, 
such as the “martial” and “journey” metaphors described by Reisfeld and Wil-
son (2004).
Returning to the mappings between distinct conceptual domains which are 
taken to underlie the use of metaphorical expressions, a recurrent feature is 
that a relatively abstract experience — such as that of understanding, or that of 
being in a relationship — is conceptualised in terms of a common physical 
e xperience — such as seeing, or embarking on a journey. This has been inter-
preted in terms of an “embodiment premise” (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and John-
son 1999; Gibbs 2003): “People’s subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in 
action provides part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought” 
(Gibbs 2003: 2). According to this view, metaphor is grounded in embodied, 
physical experience, which provides a vocabulary that can be extended to 
cover more abstract experiences. The observation of similarities in the use of 
metaphors across languages and within languages, between groups of language 
users — such as the healthy population and individuals suffering from a par-
ticular illness — is generally taken as evidence in favour of the “embodiment 
premise” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Gibbs and Franks 2002; Gibbs et al. 
2004). It is in this light that we present our analysis of metaphorical expres-
sions in descriptions of seizure experiences by patients with epileptic and psy-
chogenic non-epileptic seizures.
1.2. Listening to people with seizures
The study presented in this paper is part of the project Listening to people with 
seizures, based in Sheffield, which sets out to improve the understanding and 
differential diagnosis of seizure disorders by analysing the communication 
b ehaviour of patients with epileptic and psychogenic non-epileptic seizures 
(henceforth “NES”). While the visible manifestations of epileptic and non- 
epileptic seizures overlap to a considerable extent, their underlying causes are 
very different: epileptic seizures are caused by abnormal electrical activity in 
the brain, while NES are a response to psychological distress and represent a 
failure of alternative coping mechanisms (Reuber et al. 2005). The differentia-
tion of epilepsy and NES disorders is a major challenge: despite technological 
advances, rates of misdiagnosis remain high — up to 50% in some studies 
(Howell et al. 1989; Scheepers et al. 1998; Benbadis et al. 2004). This situation 
is alarming since the most appropriate treatments for epilepsy and NES are 
very different: most epileptic seizures can be controlled with anti-epileptic 
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drugs, whereas the treatment of choice for NES is psychotherapy (Reuber et al. 
2005). The inappropriate use of antiepileptic drugs is one of the main sources 
of risk to health and life for patients with NES (Reuber et al. 2004).
Our project builds on research done in Bielefeld, Germany, which suggests 
that, when given the space to talk freely about their experiences, patients with 
epilepsy and patients with NES behave rather differently (Schwabe et al. 2007; 
Schwabe et al. 2008; Plug et al. 2009). Broadly speaking, patients with epi-
lepsy focus on the seizure experience easily and volunteer a lot of information 
about how they feel during their seizures. Patients with NES are more likely to 
talk about the impact of the seizures on their lives and about the failure of 
p revious treatment; they need to be prompted to focus on how they feel during 
seizures, and generally volunteer less detailed information than patients with 
epilepsy. For the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that the r esearchers 
in Bielefeld also found that the differences in communication behaviour ob-
served between the two patient groups extended to their use of metaphorical 
expressions in accounts of seizures (Surmann 2005). Patients with epilepsy 
were typically found to describe their seizures as an external (and often hostile) 
entity, as in der Anfall kommt ‘the seizure comes’ — while most patients with 
NES failed to convey a coherent conceptualisation. Here we examine the use 
of metaphorical expressions by English speaking patients.
1.3. The present study
The primary goal of the present study was to describe the range of m etaphorical 
expressions which patients use when they talk about their seizure experiences. 
Is their usage highly idiosyncratic, or can the expressions be seen as instantia-
tions of conventional metaphors described in the literature? In the latter case, 
our study would strengthen Gibbs and Franks’ (2002: 161) conclusion that pa-
tients conceptualise their illness experiences “in rather conventional metaphor-
ical terms”. It should be noted that we focused our attention on the patients’ use 
of metaphors in descriptions of general or concrete seizure experiences. Many 
of the studies on metaphor in health communication discussed by Gibbs and 
Franks (2002), as well as Gibbs and Franks’ own study, use data in which pa-
tients explain how they feel about being ill, rather than how they feel during an 
acute illness episode. Finding conventional metaphorical mappings in the lat-
ter context is noteworthy, since the actual experience of the symptoms may be 
far removed from ordinary everyday thinking and reasoning.
Secondly, we wanted to determine whether the difference in the underlying 
cause of our patients’ seizures is in any way reflected in their use of meta-
phorical expressions in seizure descriptions, as suggested by Surmann’s (2005) 
study of a German patient group. If so, we have further evidence for the “em-
bodiment premise”, in the sense that the patients’ conceptual reasoning about 
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seizure episodes is directly influenced by the functioning of their bodies during 
seizure episodes. Moreover, the patterns of metaphor use may give us impor-
tant insights into the illness representations formed by patients with epileptic 
and non-epileptic seizures.
2.	 Data	and	methodology
2.1. Data
This study is based on the analysis of 21 first clinical encounters between a 
single doctor (a consultant neurologist) and patients with seizures. The clinical 
interviews were conducted between August 2005 and July 2007. All patients 
had been admitted to the neurology ward at the Royal Hallamshire Hospital in 
Sheffield, for video-EEG monitoring because their admitting neurologist was 
uncertain whether they had epileptic or non-epileptic seizures. All patients had 
seizures involving impairment of consciousness during their admission. “Gold 
standard” diagnoses were made by the video-EEG recording of a seizure, 
which was considered typical of the habitual attacks by the patient and a sei-
zure witness. Seven patients were diagnosed as having epilepsy, and thirteen as 
having NES. One patient’s diagnosis remained problematic; while we included 
his consultation at the stage of qualitative analysis, we excluded it when con-
sidering differences between the two patient groups. Pseudonyms were used to 
protect the identity of the participants. The study was approved by the South 
Sheffield Ethics Review Committee and all patients gave written informed 
consent for their consultations to be recorded and analysed.
Each consultation lasted approximately 30 minutes and followed a set of 
guidelines designed to maximise the opportunity for the patient to elaborate on 
the description of seizure experiences. For a full description of these guide-
lines, see Schwabe et al. (2007). For the purposes of this paper, it is important 
to note that the neurologist was strongly discouraged from introducing new 
information — including new metaphors. Some characteristic fragments are 
given in (1) and (2).
(1) Doctor: can I ask you what your expectation was when you hhh
  came in here this week
 Samantha: .hhh ((smacks lips)) erm well I was rather hoping (.)
  to get to the bottom of it ideally in the long term
  I’d like I’d like to ((laughing)) be cured of it erm
  ((smacks lips)) .hhh er and I I understand that
  they’ve found scarring on my on my brain (.) erm and
  they wanted to check that any seizures I had whilst I
  was in here (.) were actually coming from there and
  not something else
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 Doctor: right
  (0.3)
 Samantha: so just to really confirm that that (.) that was
  where the trouble was
 Doctor: mmm
  (1.0)
 Samantha: yeah
(2) Doctor: so you came in here to learn about the small
 Ken: yeah
 Doctor: attacks
 Ken ((swallows)) I’ve had one while I’ve been here
  (1.7)
 Doctor: [mmm
 Ken: [but they’re er (0.7) they’re just .hhh (0.9)
  they only last for a couple of seconds; there’s a
  slight sort of (.) partial seizure (0.4) it’s er
  (1.3) .hhh it sort of doesn’t develop into a full
  seizure (.) a tonic clonic er it just sort of (.)
  .hhh comes over you
 Doctor: ((nods))
Fragment (1) shows a typical opening of the consultation. The doctor starts with 
an inquiry into the patient’s expectations of the current hospital admission. As 
seen in (1), the patient is left room to elaborate and determine the agenda of the 
consultation — the doctor does not interrupt the patient and waits until it is very 
clear that the patient has finished talking before offering a response. Fragment 
(2) is from later on during a consultation. Here the doctor picks up on s omething 
the patient has said earlier. Again he leaves the patient much room to formulate 
his account. Notice, for example, the pauses in the patient’s description — the 
doctor could offer talk at various points, but refrains from doing so. This means 
that the resulting account of the patient’s seizure experience — including any 
metaphorical expressions — is almost completely constructed by the patient 
him/ herself, with minimal input from the neurologist.
2.2. Metaphor identification and categorisation
The identification and interpretation of metaphorical expressions is n otoriously 
difficult to operationalise, particularly when the aim is to analyse a specific 
corpus exhaustively (see Semino et al. 2004 for a recent discussion). In this 
research we followed the method set out by Cameron (1999, 2003) in the con-
text of applied linguistic research (see Cameron and Stelma 2004; Cameron 
and Deignan 2006; Cameron 2007 for further applications). We assume that 
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our main observations do not depend crucially on the use of this particular 
method, as opposed to, for example, that set out by Steen (1999, 2007) and 
applied by Gibbs and Franks (2002).
Cameron distinguishes between linguistic metaphors and systematic meta-
phors. Linguistic metaphors are identified by “the occurrence of a lexical item 
from a domain or semantic field different from that of the topic of the ongoing 
talk, together with a potential transfer or change of meaning from the new 
s emantic field to the ongoing topic” (Cameron 2007: 202). The lexical item is 
called the “vehicle” of the metaphor. When multiple linguistic metaphors are 
identified, they can be grouped together according to their vehicle and topic 
domains. For example, in the case of I see what you’re saying and It looks dif-
ferent from my point of view, the underlined vehicles all refer to seeing, but are 
applied to the topic of understanding. This gives rise to what Cameron calls 
“systematic metaphors”: recurrent mappings between a topic and a vehicle 
d omain, such as understanding is seeing.1
As Cameron and Stelma (2004: 121) point out, “The process of grouping 
Vehicle terms and then Topic domains to produce larger “systematic” meta-
phors is unavoidably interpretive”. We attempted to work inductively in the 
first instance, establishing vehicle domains on the basis of the data, rather than 
looking for vehicles that fit domains described in existing work on metaphor. 
Of course, we then considered how our systematic metaphors relate to previ-
ously described metaphors, focusing on cognitive linguistic studies of meta-
phor. Like Cameron (2003), we attempted to be inclusive rather than exclusive, 
including prepositions, adjectives, nouns, verbs or multi-word phrases as lin-
guistic metaphors. For example, come out of, with the patient as syntactic sub-
ject, when used to refer to a return to normality at the end of a seizure episode, 
or doing, with the seizure as syntactic subject, when used to refer to the experi-
ence of certain seizure symptoms.
2.3. Literal vs. metaphorical expressions
Previous work on metaphor in health communication has highlighted the fact 
that “the boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is fuzzy rather than 
clear-cut” (Semino et al. 2004: 1277). In the case of the present research, we 
were faced with the decision as to what aspects of a patient’s seizure descrip-
tion could be considered literal. We did this according to the following ra-
tionale. Seizures are complex physiological events that are experienced by 
patients in terms of a range of sensations and changes of state. It is therefore 
perhaps not surprising that patients commonly describe seizure experiences 
1.  In this paper we follow the convention of representing systematic metaphors in small capi-
tals. First mentions of crucial systematic metaphors are in bold small capitals.
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using verbs such as happen, occur, take place and experience. Relevant e xtracts 
from our consultations are given in (3).
(3) a.  “because er i- i- i- it’s happened, you know, erm, just making a meal, 
making tea” (Carl)
 b. “I- and I didn’t get a warning on that one, it just happened” (Vera)
 c. “and, that occurred for, no reason whatsoever” (Ken)
 d.  “I’ve always considered that the absences were taking place in cer-
tain situations of everyday life” (Carl)
 e. “I’ve never experienced anything like them” (Zack)
In addition, we find the verbs start and finish in regular use to delimit the dura-
tion of the patient’s experience, as seen in (4).
(4) a. “it started about ten o’clock in the morning actually” (Jack)
 b. “and then one of these things started” (Trudie)
 c. “they just have to wait until it’s finished” (Tammy)
We suggest that the linguistic expressions exemplified in (3) and (4) can be 
considered literal, and they are not further considered in this paper.
We were uncertain about a small number of expressions, which routinely 
occur in the context of describing feelings, conditions and situations. The main 
ones among these are come on, bring on, develop and control. Examples of 
these are given in (5).
(5) a. “and my attacks kept coming on” (Vera)
 b. “when I get more anxious, that brings on more seizures” (Sue)
 c.  “you feel as if you going to have a tonic clonic seizure, but it never 
develops” (Ken)
 d.  “or sometimes I’ll have just gone into a smaller one and not been able 
to control it” (David)
The two researchers involved in identifying and categorising the metaphors 
(LP and MR) disagreed about the precise nature of the vehicle domain of these 
expressions. Come on and bring on suggest motion, but did not straightfor-
wardly fit in the motion-related vehicle domains we established. We are aware 
that at least develop and control have been mentioned in the cognitive linguis-
tic literature on metaphor: develop as an instantiation of the living organisms 
metaphor (Kövecses 2000a: 104), and control as an instantiation of the oppo-
nent (in a struggle) metaphor (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987: 205). In the case of 
develop, the “living organism” vehicle domain again did not straightforwardly 
relate to the other vehicle domains we established. In the case of control, we 
are reluctant to adopt Lakoff and Kövecses’ vehicle domain, given the repeated 
occurrence of the term in their non-metaphorical characterisation of the do-
main. For example, they state that “The opponent metaphor focuses on the is-
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sue of control and the danger of loss of control to the angry person himself  ” 
(Lakoff and Kövecses 1987: 206). Likewise, Bowker (1996) describes several 
“metaphors of control” in the context of communication about dealing with 
cancer — treating control as the topic of the metaphors, not the vehicle.
These doubtful expressions constituted 38 out of 282 potential linguistic 
metaphors, or 13%. Their omission leaves a core data set of 244 linguistic 
metaphors, to which we now turn.
3.	 Overview	of	metaphors
3.1. Spatial metaphors
Across consultations we find many linguistic expressions in which the seizure 
experience is described in spatial terms — locations and movement. For ex-
ample, one systematic metaphor can be labelled having a seizure is movement 
to/from an unspecified location. Related linguistic metaphors include drift-
ing off, going down, coming back, being somewhere else, not being there and 
being sent off. In all of these, the patient describes temporarily being in a dif-
ferent location — that is, a bounded region in space — from that in which he 
finds himself normally, without elaborating on the nature of this location. Ex-
amples are given in (6).
(6) a.  “I’m off somewhere else having a jolly adventure or something” 
(Alastair)
 b.  “I could be halfway from a sentence, chatting away and stop, and 
then that’s it, I’m gone” (Barbara)
 c. “I feel I’m going to go down or something, I don’t know” (Betty)
 d.  “and then I start thinking about that sort of thing, and then it starts 
sending me off  ” (Sue)
 e.  “it’s when I’m coming round people are, like, talking to me but I 
can’t get no words out” (Chris)
 f. “so I, like, went out, came back, and that were it” (David)
A further set of linguistic metaphors suggests that the seizure itself may be 
viewed in spatial terms In other words, the seizure is an unspecified loca-
tion. These mostly involve prepositions and phrasal verbs: patients describe 
going into seizures, being in them, going through them and coming out of 
them. Examples are given in (7).
(7) a.  “so he tries to talk to me, to stop me going back into another one” 
(Sue)
 b.  “the only way you go into a fit is if you’re stressed or upset or, in 
front of flashing light” (Tallulah)
 c.  “I’m scared about them and I’m scared in them, they do really scare 
me” (Laura)
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 d.  “and when I finally come out of it properly, I just start crying” 
(T allulah)
 e. “you can’t fetch yourself out of it, it’s weird” (Tammy)
These systematic metaphors are consistent with the conceptual event struc-
ture metaphor posited by Lakoff (1990, 1993). Lakoff identifies numerous 
metaphorical expressions in English, which appear to rely on a mapping 
b etween the source domain of space to the target domain of events, such that 
events, including changes of state, activities and actions, are understood in 
terms of physical movement and space. Lakoff posits a number of “subordi-
nate” conceptual metaphors, which are more specific instantiations of the same 
mapping between space and event. Among these, states are locations and 
changes in state are movements would seem particularly relevant to the lin-
guistic metaphors illustrated in (6) and (7). Following Lakoff’s approach, hav-
ing a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified location can be seen as 
subordinate to changes in state are movements, and the seizure is an unspeci-
fied location as subordinate to states are locations — they rely on a mapping 
between the domain of space and a specific sub-domain of events, namely that 
of seizure events. This finding is consistent with those of Gibbs and Franks 
(2002), who identify systematic metaphors such as cancer is an obstacle on 
life’s journey, a specific instantiation of life is a journey (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980), as well as with the observation that states are locations is readily 
a pplied in the more specific domains of mental, psychological and emotional 
states (Sweetser 1990; Cienki 1998).
Our patients use a number of additional linguistic metaphors, which are con-
sistent with Lakoff’s event structure metaphor. In particular, Lakoff identifies 
the subordinate conceptual metaphors difficulties are impediments to motion 
and external events are large moving objects. The former accounts for 
e xpressions such as those in (8), most of which apply to a state of partial 
c onsciousness and suggest a systematic metaphor along the lines of retaining/
regaining consciousness is impeded motion. In (8a) and (8b), Sue’s expres-
sions of her inability to move imply an impediment, which she does not 
d escribe further; in (8c), Steve specifies the impediment as something which 
exerts force on him; and in (8d), the impediment is a brick wall which blocks 
Trudie’s metaphorical movement.
(8) a. “it’s like I want to come back, and I can’t” (Sue)
 b. “I felt like I was in something and I couldn’t get out” (Sue)
 c. “it’s like something’s holding me” (Steve)
 d.  “I was trying to will my eyes open but couldn’t, and then it was like 
trying to fight your way through a brick wall, it was really strange” 
(Trudie)
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external events are large moving objects accounts for a substantial number 
of linguistic metaphors which, like those discussed so far, involve movement 
through space — but movement of the seizure, rather than of the patient — in 
other words, the seizure is a moving object. Our patients describe seizures as 
coming and going, as being brought in or on, as being sent in, let pass, stopped 
or contained. Examples are given in (9). Notice that the expressions in (9b) and 
(9f  ) suggest that the space within which the seizure moves is the patient’s body 
or self, which is consistent with the conceptual metaphors the self is a con-
tainer (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gibbs 1994) and the body is a container 
(Kövecses 2000a).
(9) a.  “just suddenly like ooh it felt a bit funny, press the buzzer, and . . . it 
did come just like that” (Ken)
 b.  “and it goes all the way down my body, and I can’t do anything then” 
(Sandra)
 c.  “if I look at a lot of little squares, or little circles, they bring on sei-
zures” (Sue)
 d. “I usually stand still and, let it pass” (Sandra)
 e.  “every time I’ve had carrots I’ve had, like, it’s gone and I’ve stopped 
it” (David)
 f. “I had to contain it, so that it was within myself  ” (Ken)
The spatial metaphors discussed so far suggest a preliminary answer to our 
first research question concerning the degree to which patients’ metaphorical 
expressions are idiosyncratic, in favour of the idea that in describing illness 
experiences, patients draw on conventional metaphors used in everyday lan-
guage (Gibbs and Franks 2002). We have seen that the systematic spatial meta-
phors found in our data — having a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified 
location, the seizure is an unspecified location, retaining/regaining con-
sciousness is impeded motion, and the seizure is a moving object — can all 
be seen as specific instantiations of the higher-order event structure meta-
phor, which establishes a conceptual mapping between events and (movement 
through) space.
3.2. Metaphors involving an external agent
A number of our patients use expressions which suggest that the seizure is 
personified — that is, conceptualised in terms of an actor external to the patient, 
who is engaged in some form of purposeful activity. The relevant systematic 
metaphors can be labelled a seizure involves actions performed by an 
e xternal agent: the seizure or some aspect of the seizure experience is 
d escribed in terms of an external entity whose actions impact on the patient. 
In most of these, the seizure or some aspect of the seizure experience is a 
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“p rototypical agent” in the sense of Van Oosten (1985), in that it has primary 
responsibility for the action that is described in the sentence or local discourse, 
and the action appears to be intentional. An elaborate example is given in (10). 
Here Carl describes the seizure experience in terms of someone controlling an 
electrical current that he needs in order to function normally.
(10)  “I’ve always likened them to erm, you know somebody having the fin-
ger on an electric socket, and turning it off and on. [Like] you’ve got the 
power on the radio, and then it ((imitates sound of radio going on and 
off  )), and it just keeps coming off and — because somebody’s doing it 
here and you can’t see them” (Carl)
Further examples are given in (11).
(11) a.  “it feels as if somebody’s pouring cold or really hot water on the top 
of my head” (Pat)
 b. “I can feel what it’s doing, and that’s about it” (David)
 c.  “then I have no control over what it’s — it’s just going to do what it’s 
going to do, and there’s not anything I can do” (Zack)
These examples illustrate two important characteristics of expressions of this 
type. First, the action performed against the patient is invariably experienced 
as unpleasant; and second, patients often explicitly refer to their lack of control 
in the situation. In fact, in a number of cases the action performed against the 
patient is characterised as violent, and patients sometimes refer to attempts at 
counteracting the external entity. Relevant examples are given in (12).
(12) a. “and that was the only time it’s ever knocked me out” (Carl)
 b.  “I thought it were trying to like, force itself out of me, that’s what I 
thought it were trying to do” (David)
 c. “they just creep up on you and they get you, that’s it” (Ken)
 d.  “I tried to not let it go any further than what it were trying to get at” 
(David)
 e. “cause I do sometimes try and fight them, I know I fight them” (Sue)
These examples arguably motivate a systematic metaphor along the lines of a 
seizure involves a struggle with an opponent: a specific subtype of a sei-
zure involves actions performed by an external agent which involves violent 
actions and attempts by the patient to counteract these.
These linguistic metaphors show obvious similarities with the emotion met-
aphors described by Kövecses (1986, 2000a). For example, Kövecses distin-
guishes the systematic metaphors anger is an opponent in a struggle and fear 
is a hidden enemy. Both “anger” and “fear” can be substituted by “the seizure” 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
Metaphors in the description of seizure experiences 221
to account for linguistic metaphors such as those in (11). Anger provides a 
particularly close match. As Lakoff and Kövecses (1987: 205) point out, anger 
“produces undesirable physiological reactions, leads to an inability to function 
normally, and is dangerous to others”. The same can be said to some extent 
about seizures. Lakoff and Kövecses establish a cognitive model of anger, 
which is constituted by, and underlies, the various systematic metaphors for 
anger they identify in normal American English speech (see Kövecses 2000b 
for cross-linguistic evidence). This cognitive model represents a “prototype 
scenario” of an anger episode. Notably, in the model, anger exists as an entity 
external to the self which takes control of the self despite the self’s efforts to 
control anger. As shown in Figure 1, substituting “anger” with “seizure” pro-
vides a conceptual basis for the linguistic metaphors in (10) to (12), as well as 
a “prototype scenario” of a seizure episode that matches the narratives of some 
of our patients closely.
Again, then, we find evidence supporting the idea that patients draw on con-
ventional metaphors used in everyday language when describing their seizure 
experiences — in this case, metaphors relating to emotions in which the emo-
tions are conceptualised as external agents.
Figure 1.  Selection from Lakoff and Kövecses’ (1987) cognitive model of anger ( left) and p arallel 
version for the seizure (right)
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3.3. Technological metaphors
A small number of patients use linguistic metaphors that draw on the language 
of technology. These suggest that the seizure or a certain stage in seizure epi-
sodes is experienced as a mechanical process. Metaphors of this type are par-
ticularly prevalent in the narrative of one patient, Zack.2 For example, he de-
scribes the onset of seizure symptoms as an automated process during which 
the only command I can actually get through is to hold on. His subsequent loss 
of consciousness is like shutting a computer off, and when he regains con-
sciousness he needs time to load things back up. Other patients use similar 
expressions. For example, describing seizures in terms of a malfunction (Carl), 
or a process that can be set off or started up (Laura). Together, these can be 
related to the systematic metaphor a seizure is a mechanical process.
More specifically, Zack suggests that his seizures involve a degree of dis-
connection between himself, or his mind, and his body. Losing consciousness 
feels like a loss of connection between my mind and my body. The resulting 
state of reduced consciousness is sort of like the lights are on but nobody’s at 
home; a state in which my eyes [are] sending the information to my brain but 
it [isn’t] there to receive it. One other patient similarly describes his experience 
in terms of feeling disconnected, suggesting that it’s almost as if my head car-
ries on without me (Alastair). Moreover, two other patients refer to electricity 
in describing seizure symptoms. Sandra indicates that in some milder seizure, 
it’ll just be the electricity that starts, and then wears off, while Steve refers to 
receiving an electrical charge and an electrical shock, and compares the p rocess 
in his brain to that governing plasma balls. These metaphors arguably motivate 
the more specific systematic metaphors a seizure involves dis connection be-
tween mind and body and a seizure involves an electrical charge.
The occurrence of metaphors drawing on the language of technology is not 
surprising if we consider that patients mostly use them when focusing on what 
is happening in their brains or minds during seizure episodes. It has been 
pointed out that technological metaphors are pervasive in academic as well as 
in lay discourse on brain functioning (Goschler 2005), and the mind has been 
named among the target domains of the complex systems metaphor, which maps 
abstract complex systems — the mind, the body, society — to the source d omain 
of complex physical objects such as buildings and machines (Kövecses 2000a). 
Kövecses suggests that the complex systems metaphor is of the same order of 
abstraction as the event structure metaphor discussed above. As such, it is 
2.  Zack is the patient whose diagnosis we described as problematic in Section 2. His seizures are 
most likely caused by stretch syncope in the context of obsessive compulsive disorder, and not 
by epilepsy or a non-epileptic seizure disorder. His metaphors are discussed here, but were not 
included in the analysis presented in Section 4 below.
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instantiated by several layers of more specific metaphors. Kövecses lists the 
functioning of the complex system is the functioning of the object among its 
directly subordinate metaphors, and the seizure-related metaphors discussed in 
this section can be seen as specific instantiations of this conceptual mapping. It 
may be noted that in most of the linguistic metaphors discussed as instances of 
a seizure is a mechanical process and a seizure involves an electrical charge, 
the seizure is described as involving a mechanical or electrical process per se, 
while in the case of a seizure involves disconnection between mind and body, 
the seizure is not conceptualised as a complex system itself; rather, it is de-
scribed as causing a disruption in the normal functioning of the complex sys-
tem constituted by the mind and the body. Notwithstanding this variation in 
target domain, it seems clear that in using these metaphors, patients are draw-
ing on conventional metaphors of the mind and brain when attempting to de-
scribe their seizure experiences.
4.	 Relevance	for	differential	diagnosis
Having established that patients draw on conventional metaphors used in 
e veryday language when describing their seizure experiences, we now turn 
to our second research question: are there differences in the use of meta-
phorical language between patients belonging to the two different clinical sub-
groups — epilepsy vs. NES? We have previously reported statistically signifi-
cant differences in the use of a range of expressions between the two patient 
groups if these expressions are allocated to a small number of broad meta-
phoric conceptualisations (Plug et al. 2009). Our adoption of the more specific 
method of identifying and grouping metaphorical expressions set out above, 
with reference to the applied and cognitive linguistic literature on metaphor, 
has resulted in a more detailed picture of the use of metaphorical language by 
our patients, with more fine-grained distinctions between subgroups of tokens. 
The larger number of metaphoric conceptualisations (and the limited size of 
the dataset) means that we cannot apply the same statistical methods used in 
our previous publication (Plug et al. 2009). Nevertheless, we will show that 
different tendencies in the use of the systematic metaphors distinguished above 
can be discerned, and will argue that they are largely consistent with both 
our previous findings and those of Surmann (2005) for a German patient popu-
lation. We focus on spatial metaphors and metaphors involving an external 
agent. Technological metaphors constitute too small a set to show differential 
tendencies.
4.1. Usage patterns
Starting with spatial metaphors, we have distinguished four systematic meta-
phors: having a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified location, the 
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s eizure is an unspecified location, retaining/regaining consciousness is im-
peded motion, and the seizure is a moving object. Figure 2 shows that the first 
two of these, which both involve an implied or overt reference to an unspeci-
fied location, are more frequently used by patients with NES. The seizure is a 
moving object, on the other hand, is more frequently found in our consultations 
with patients with epilepsy. retaining/regaining consciousness is impeded mo-
tion is used only by patients with NES, although the total number of usages is 
rather low ( N = 6). A Chi-square test confirms that patients with epilepsy and 
NES show significantly different usage tendencies across these systematic 
metaphors (χ2 = 91, df = 3, p < 0.001).
The more detailed figures in Table 1 suggest that these differential t endencies 
are unlikely to be due to idiosyncratic usage patterns for individual patients. In 
the case of having a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified location, nine 
out of thirteen patients with NES use linguistic metaphors in this category, and 
three out of seven patients with epilepsy do. The patients with NES c ollectively 
use many more “types” of metaphors — that is, distinct linguistic metaphors —  
in this category. In other words, the use of linguistic metaphors consistent with 
the systematic metaphor having a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified 
location is more widespread among patients with NES than among patients 
with epilepsy, and the former show more variety in their usage as well as a 
greater total number of instances. For the seizure is an unspecified location 
Figure 2.  Frequency of tokens of systematic metaphors in the speech of patients with epileptic 
(ES) and non-epileptic seizures ( NES) for spatial metaphors.
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and retaining/regaining consciousness is impeded motion, the differences are 
all in the same direction. More patients with NES use more distinct linguistic 
metaphors and a greater total number of instances. For the seizure is a moving 
object, the pattern is the reverse. All seven patients with epilepsy use linguistic 
metaphors in this category, compared with four out of thirteen patients with 
NES. Patients with epilepsy collectively use a greater variety of linguistic met-
aphors as well as a greater total number of instances.
We have distinguished two systematic metaphors involving an external 
agent: a seizure involves actions performed by an external agent and a sei-
zure involves a struggle with an opponent. Figure 3 shows that both of these 
are more frequently employed by patients with epilepsy, although the differ-
ence between ES and NES is only of one token for the latter. The size of the 
data subset for these metaphors does not allow reliable statistical analysis, but 
the difference between patient groups for a seizure involves actions performed 
by an external agent is particularly suggestive.
Again, a closer look at the counts shows that the differences in token fre-
quencies are related to differences in the number of patients using relevant 
metaphorical expressions, and the variety displayed in their usage. In the case 
of a seizure involves actions performed by an external agent, three out of 
seven patients with epilepsy use linguistic metaphors in this category, com-
pared with one out of thirteen patients with NES. Moreover, patients with epi-
lepsy use six distinct linguistic metaphors, rather than a single one repeatedly. 
For a seizure involves a struggle with an opponent, the differences are all in 
the same direction, although they are very small.
Table 1.	 	Number of tokens and types of systematic metaphors in the speech of patients with epi-
leptic (ES) and non-epileptic seizures ( NES) for spatial metaphors
Systematic metaphor Disorder N patients N types N tokens
movement to/from an unspecified 
location
ES  3  4  6
NES  9 18 90
Subtotal 12 20 96
the seizure is an unspecified 
location
ES  3  5 15
NES  7 11 37
Subtotal 10 14 52
impeded motion ES  0  0  0
NES  3  6  6
Subtotal  3  6  6
the seizure is a moving object ES  7 18 42
NES  4  6 10
Subtotal 11 22 52
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4.2. Experiential basis
To summarise so far, our descriptive statistics suggest that patients with NES 
show a greater tendency than patients with epilepsy to use instances of the 
systematic metaphors the seizure is an unspecified location and, less robustly, 
retaining/regaining consciousness is impeded motion, while patients with epi-
lepsy show a greater tendency than patients with NES to use instances of the 
systematic metaphors the seizure is a moving object, a seizure involves ac-
tions performed by an external agent and, less robustly, a seizure involves a 
struggle with an opponent. While the extent to which these findings can be 
generalised to larger patient groups remains to be established, they are con-
sistent with the notion that — despite superficial behavioural similarities —  
epileptic and non-epileptic seizures give rise to distinct experiences, which are 
expressed differently by the two patient groups.
Figure 3.  Number of tokens of systematic metaphors in the speech of patients with epileptic (ES) 
and non-epileptic seizures ( NES) for metaphors involving an external agent.
Table 2.	 	Number of tokens and types of systematic metaphors in the speech of patients with epi-
leptic (ES) and non-epileptic seizures ( NES) for metaphors involving an external agent
Systematic metaphor Disorder N patients N types N tokens
actions performed by an external agent ES 3 6 8
NES 1 1 1
Subtotal 4 6 9
struggle with an opponent ES 3 4 4
NES 2 2 3
Subtotal 5 6 7
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Recall that prior to our investigation, a German study (Surmann 2005) had 
suggested that patients with epilepsy recurrently conceptualise the seizure as 
an external entity, while patients with NES often fail to establish a coherent 
conceptualisation. Whilst we concur with the first finding, our findings in En-
glish speaking patients do not corroborate the latter observation. Most of the 
linguistic metaphors in the data are used at least once by patients with epilepsy 
and NES alike, and some systematic metaphors are more common in our con-
sultations with patients with NES. Our previous quantitative study (Plug et al. 
2009) found evidence for patients with epilepsy describing the seizure as an 
external entity more readily than for patients with NES, and the findings pre-
sented above are consistent with this. In the metaphorical expressions favoured 
by patients with epilepsy — the seizure is a moving object, a seizure involves 
actions performed by an external agent, a seizure involves a struggle with 
an opponent — the seizure is either an external object that moves towards or 
away from the patient, or an external agent that is either invisible to the patient, 
or visible as an opponent, and whose actions impact on the patient.
This conceptualisation is rather different from the systematic metaphors 
prevalent in consultations with patients with NES. The metaphors preferred by 
this patient group — having a seizure is movement to/from an unspecified lo-
cation, the seizure is an unspecified location, and retaining/regaining con-
sciousness is impeded motion — are indicative of a conceptualisation in which 
having a seizure involves movement on the patient’s part — the patient is not 
stationary, with an external entity impacting on him, as in the case of the meta-
phors favoured by patients with epilepsy, but rather moves between several 
locations. In the event structure metaphorical model set out by Lakoff (1993), 
this would correspond to states are locations and actions are self-propelled 
motions. With these conceptual mappings in mind, we can suggest that patients 
who portray the seizure most prominently in terms of an unspecified location, 
referring to movement towards, through and away from it, display a conceptu-
alisation of the seizure experience in which they themselves are the actors and 
the seizure is a state they reach through their actions. Patients who mostly por-
tray the seizure as a moving object or external agent, on the other hand, display 
a conceptualisation in which they are reactors to the seizure’s action, which 
lies outside of their direct control.
This analysis is interesting in light of what we know about the underlying 
causes of epileptic and non-epileptic seizures and about illness representations 
and preferred coping styles in these patient groups. As indicated above, e pileptic 
seizures are caused by involuntary, excessive and hypersynchronous electrical 
activity in the brain. NES are a response to some form of psychological or 
s ocial distress with which the patient fails to cope. The conceptualisations 
p roposed above fit well with these aetiologies. Epileptic seizures are events 
beyond the patient’s volition and direct control, while NES are comparable to 
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mental states which patients find themselves in. The conceptualisation pre-
ferred by patients with NES suggests that patients do experience a degree of 
control in relation to their seizures. This is not to say that every NES is self-
inflicted or could be stopped by patients at will. However, the seizure disorder 
is presented as being rooted in an aspect of the patient’s own behaviour, and the 
metaphors used suggest that patients may retain a degree of control over their 
actions during the seizures.
In fact, it may even be said that the metaphorical language used by the pa-
tients is more compatible with the underlying causes of their disorder than their 
literal language. Previous research into the illness representations of patients 
with epilepsy and NES has shown significant differences between the two 
p atient groups. A crucial notion is that of the health “locus of control”, which 
describes the extent to which an illness or disorder is related to internal or ex-
ternal factors. In a recent study, Stone et al. (2004) found that in comparison 
with patients with epilepsy, those with NES reported a more external locus of 
control. In keeping with this, they believe less strongly than patients with epi-
lepsy that psychological factors could be a factor in the occurrence of their 
seizures. Although patients with NES have experienced significantly more 
negative life events than patients with epilepsy (Binzer et al. 2004), they have 
a greater tendency than patients with epilepsy to deny the relevance of these 
events or their emotional consequences for the aetiology of their seizures 
(Stone et al. 2004). We can find evidence in our data that is consistent with 
these findings, which were mostly based on self-report questionnaires. The 
fragments in (13) to (15) show representative exchanges between the doctor 
and patients with NES on the topics of stress, anxiety and degree of control 
over the seizures.
(13) Doctor: but you say you’re still worried to leave the house
 Chris: oh yeah I have been yeah
 Doctor: yeah
 Chris: I’ve been depressed (.) even contemplated ending it
  but I’ve got a little lad that I love to bits (3.2)
  and I’ve had a lot of looks like that as if I’m
  mental do you know what I mean I’m not mental (0.5)
  I’ve had that I’ve off- I’ve been offered (.)
  psychiatrists I don’t need them I ain’t daft
 Doctor: mmm
 Chris: I ain’t making it up
(14) Doctor: so what about the seizure here? (0.5) do you think
  they were related to you feeling anxious or
  (1.3)
 Tallulah: no because I’ve been relaxed when I’ve been in here
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(15) Betty: other people think it’s er helping a little bit cos
  they’ve said that the er (.) seizures I’m having
  aren’t as bad while I’ve been on medication but I’m
  still having them (0.7) and I just want them
  (0.4)
 Doctor: mmm
 Betty: I want someone to fix them (0.6) do you know what I
  mean
  (10.7)
 Doctor: you say other people say they’re better
 Betty: I don’t remember
 Doctor: mmm
 Betty: I don’t notice a difference at all
In (13), Chris indicates that he has been seriously depressed, even suicidal. 
However, he claims that his mental state is caused by his disorder, and strongly 
denies that the causal relationship may be the other way around. For Chris, 
acknowledging that his seizures have a “psychological” basis is equivalent to 
admitting that he is “making them up”; therefore, he maintains that there 
must be a physical explanation for his seizures. In (14), Tallulah denies that 
her r ecent seizures might be caused by anxiety, since she has felt “relaxed” 
during her hospital visit. Notably, earlier in the consultation, Tallulah has indi-
cated that she was afraid on arrival in hospital — afraid of being alone, and of 
not waking up from a seizure. Like Chris, she considers her anxiety to be 
caused by, rather than to contribute to, her seizure disorder. In (15), Betty 
s uggests that she has little or no control over, or knowledge of, her seizures. 
She wants to be cured, but considers this to be a process that she cannot con-
tribute to.
Patients with epilepsy, on the other hand, often offer observations on the 
relationship between the occurrence of their seizures and psychological factors 
such as stress or anxiety. Some examples are given in (16), all from different 
consultations.
(16) a.  “you know when I get more anxious, erm, it brings on more 
s eizures”
 b. “I have to be doing something fairly intensive or fairly busy”
 c.  “I’d been shopping, and because I couldn’t find what I was looking 
for, I got the absence”
 d.  “one of the hurricanes partly destroyed the house, so that was a bit 
of a cause, and that made me have a bad seizure afterwards”
 e.  “I can usually put it down to being tired — tired, erm, not eating, 
stress”
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
230 L. Plug et al.
All of these patients with epilepsy suggest — without explicit prompting by the 
doctor — that certain circumstances, traumatic experiences or mental states 
precipitate or even trigger seizures.
Previous research has suggested that metaphorical language can be used to 
manipulate perceived degrees of agency and volition in certain experiences. 
Balaban (1999: 129) reports the “central dynamic of attributing discordant 
thoughts and feelings to an external, divine agent” in certain types of religious 
discourse. For example, when pilgrims report religious experiences, they tend 
to use metaphorical expressions consistent with an experience attributable to 
an outside agent rather than to their own mental state. In such cases, the meta-
phorical language follows — and reinforces — literal language: the pilgrims aim 
to put across the message that their experiences are beyond their own imagina-
tion. Our findings suggest that, in some contexts, speakers’ metaphorical lan-
guage puts across a different message from the one that they convey “literally”. 
Patients with NES deny any agency in relation to the occurrence of their sei-
zures, but show a preference for metaphorical expressions, which suggests that 
they do retain a certain degree of agency. Patients with epilepsy acknowledge 
a great degree of self-control or responsibility in relation to their seizures, but 
preferentially use metaphorical expressions that attribute agency to the seizure 
as an external entity. Interestingly, in both cases, the metaphorical language 
appears to be more in line with the medical and psychodynamic understanding 
of the aetiology of the patients’ seizures than their literal language.
5.	 Conclusion
This paper has explored the occurrence of metaphorical expressions in descrip-
tions of seizure experiences offered by patients in consultation with a neurolo-
gist. Inspired by previous work in this area, notably Gibbs and Franks (2002) 
and Surmann (2005), it set out to address two questions. First, what is the range 
of metaphorical expressions which patients use in describing their seizure ex-
periences: is their usage highly idiosyncratic, or can the expressions be seen as 
instantiations of conventional metaphors described in the literature? Second, is 
the difference in the underlying cause of our patients’ seizure experiences —  
epilepsy vs. non-epileptic disorders — in any way reflected in their use of met-
aphorical expressions when describing their seizures? Our study suggests that 
the answer to both of these questions is affirmative. We have seen that the lin-
guistic metaphors attested in our consultations suggest systematic metaphors, 
which are straightforwardly related to conventional metaphors on which lan-
guage users draw when talking about events, emotions and brain functioning 
in non-clinical contexts.
We have also observed different tendencies in metaphor usage between 
p atients with epilepsy and patients with NES, although our data set is too small 
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to allow comprehensive statistical testing. Our observations are partly consis-
tent with those of Surmann (2005), and interestingly, they suggest that patients’ 
literal and metaphorical language may conflict in what they tell the doctor 
about the patient’s disorder. Patients with epilepsy may claim that they have a 
certain degree of mental or physical control over their seizures, while their 
preference in the use of metaphorical expressions suggests that they are more 
likely to experience seizures as an external entity. Patients with NES typically 
deny having any degree of control over their seizures, while their metaphorical 
language suggests that their seizure experience is more consistent with a men-
tal state, which they enter and return from. Notably, it is the patients’ meta-
phorical language that is more closely in line with the medical understanding 
of the aetiology of the seizure disorders, while their literal language can be 
considered paradoxical.
As such, our findings strongly support Gibbs and Franks’ (2002) proposal 
that the metaphorical expressions employed by people who are ill recruit the 
same system of conceptual mappings on which healthy people draw when talk-
ing about everyday experiences. They also provide further evidence for the 
“embodiment premise”. In describing highly subjective experiences for which 
little conventional vocabulary is available — a task whose difficulty they often 
overtly acknowledge — our patients draw on conventional metaphorical map-
pings which are rooted in common physical experience. Moreover, differences 
in the physical nature and experiential manifestation of the two types of seizure 
appear to be reflected in the exact nature of the metaphorical language used by 
the respective patient groups. In fact, our findings suggest that paying attention 
to metaphorical language is clinically relevant: doing so makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of the illness representations formed by pa-
tients with seizures (Kemp et al. 1999; Green et al. 2004) and of how they cope 
with their disorder (Monzoni and Reuber 2009). Further, it may contribute 
to the accurate differential diagnosis of seizure disorders. The feasibility of 
undertaking the kind of analysis we have described in a routine clinical setting 
remains to be established — but this study lays the necessary empirical ground-
work for further investigations along these lines.
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